reported less than 5 percent Medicare days in 1977. In contrast, M edicaid provides half the industry's revenues and supports, at least partially, 60 percent o f nursing home residents (National Center for Health Statistics, 1977) .
The difference in the two program s' importance results from d if ferences in their definitions o f covered care. First, Medicare covers skilled care; M edicaid, skilled and intermediate care. Second, Medicare defines skilled care far more narrowly than do many state Medicaid programs. According to the law, both Medicare and Medicaid are to lim it coverage for skilled care to persons needing:
. . . on a daily basis skilled nursing care (provided directly by or requiring the supervision o f skilled nursing personnel) or other skilled rehabilitation services, which as a practical matter can only be provided in a skilled nursing facility on an inpatient basis . . . (P.L. 9 2 -6 0 3 , 1972, Section 247)
In practice, the two program s define skilled coverage differently and finance different types o f skilled-level nursing home care. Designed by law as an alternative to extended hospital stays, the Medicare skilled nursing home benefit offers elderly and disabled beneficiaries a m axim um o f 100 days o f intensive nursing or rehabilitation care following a hospital stay. M ost Medicare patients obtain short-term coverage for nursing or rehabilitation services delivered on a daily basis.
In contrast, M edicaid, which covers health care for the poor, finances relatively long nursing home stays in skilled as well as intermediate care facilities. M edicaid skilled benefits are not lim ited to 100 days and do not require a prior hospital stay. More important in explaining longer stays is the fact that in many states Medicaid-covered patients are receiving general rather than specific skilled nursing services (in cluding supervision o f aide-delivered assistance in activities o f daily living) or have mental or physical problems that make them difficult for nursing homes to manage.
M ed icare B en efits
Medicare lim its its coverage and liabilities for nursing homes in several ways. Medicare is prohibited by law from covering custodial care. To assure that care is " skilled ," in ambiguous cases program rules tie coverage to changes in patients' conditions. Medicare also lim its its liabilities by determining coverage after care has been delivered and by putting nursing homes at financial risk for subm itting claims that Medicare's fiscal agents (intermediaries) reject.
Unless patients are receiving specific treatments (like intravenous or intramuscular injections, tube feedings, or aspiration o f air pas sages), Medicare coverage for skilled nursing care is difficult to obtain. The law authorizes coverage for nursing observation or supervision o f unskilled services, but regulations restrict coverage for observation to patients whose condition is " unstable" and supervision to cases with a " high probability" o f complications. It is the nursing home's responsibility to document " instability" or " risk ," typically by pro viding evidence o f actual changes in a patient's condition. A patient whose only needs are for assistance in activities o f daily living or whose deterioration reflects the aging process and not a specific medical condition would not be covered.
Coverage for skilled rehabilitation services is similarly dependent upon changes in patients' conditions and their documentation. R eg ulations define care as skilled only when patients have " rehabilitation potential"-a potential for "significant" improvement in the condition being treated within a " reasonable" (and generally predictable) period. Patients who have reached their " rehabilitation potential" are judged to need only " maintenance therapy," which is not considered a skilled service once a professional has developed a plan o f care.
Coverage is determined after care has been delivered, when the nursing home subm its a claim. A nursing home will be liable for claims denied if more than 5 percent o f the days the home claimed as covered in the previous quarter were denied by the intermediary. Although most homes do not exceed this ceiling, this performance often reflects a conservative interpretation o f Medicare rules. Deter mination that a patient was " unstable," at " risk ," or lacking " re habilitation potential" is considerably more precise ex post than ex ante. Skilled practitioners often differ considerably in m aking prog noses, particularly short-term ones, about individual patients. To assure certainty of payment, minimize burdens of documentation, and avoid financial risk, homes are likely to inform patients not receiving treatments clearly labeled skilled that they are ineligible for Medicare coverage.
Although there is considerable variation in intermediaries' inter pretation o f coverage rules (Sm its et al., 1982) , the rules and the coverage process have effectively lim ited Medicare benefits to the short term nursing home care specified in the Medicare statute. The effec tiveness o f these criteria is demonstrated by the fact that 1977 Medicarecovered stays averaged 28.1 days, as compared with a 227-day average stay for all patients in skilled nursing homes (H elbing, 1980; National Center for Health Statistics, 1977) .
M e d ic a id B en efits
Since 1972, federal law has required Medicare and Medicaid to apply the same criteria for skilled-level coverage. Some states (e .g ., O kla homa, Iowa, Texas, and Oregon) do apply coverage criteria equivalent to or more restrictive than those of Medicare and, as a result, finance very little skilled care. But other states interpret coverage criteria more broadly than Medicare. The breadth o f these criteria is apparent from Medicaid patients' extensive use o f skilled nursing facilities. In fiscal year 1979, M edicaid programs paid for more than 80 million days in skilled nursing facilities (Health Care Financing Administration, 1980) ; Medicare paid for only 8 m illion days (Health Care Financing Adm inistration, 1981) . A lm ost 80 percent of the Medicaid-covered days went to elderly M edicaid recipients who were potentially eligible for Medicare-covered days (Health Care Financing Administration, 1980) . Although M edicaid does not require a hospital stay prior to nursing home coverage, it is unlikely that the absence of this re quirement explains the high volume o f Medicaid coverage. Preliminary evidence from Health Care Financing Administration (H CFA) dem onstrations elim inating the 3-day hospital stay requirement for M edi care indicates that M edicare's definition o f covered care-not the prerequisite hospital stay-is the primary factor lim iting Medicare use (Schwartz et a l., 1980) .
States with broader interpretations o f skilled coverage than Medicare define coverage in different ways. W hile Medicare tends to tie coverage to changes in patients' conditions, some states award benefits for maintenance therapy and supervision of an aggregate of unskilled services based on a patient's current status. M assachusetts, for example, allows skilled coverage for maintenance therapy to patients with ad vanced Parkinson's disease. In contrast, Medicare intermediaries in dicate that such coverage would be inappropriate if patients have reached their " restoration potential" and do not require skilled nursing care.
Functional lim itations are sometimes explicit criteria for coverage, as in Massachusetts. U ntil recently, Connecticut offered an extreme example o f this approach, classifying as " skilled" all patients who are incapable o f leaving the facility independently in the case o f an emergency. Medicare intermediaries emphasize that a person whose needs for institutional care rest solely on functional incapacities is not eligible for Medicare coverage.
Some states have made " skilled" care synonymous with higher cost care. When a patient needs more services than can be purchased at rates paid to intermediate facilities, the care is classified as skilled. This policy may explain states' willingness to cover supervision of patients needing extensive assistance. Skilled classification, with its higher rates, may also be necessary to assure access to care for other patients likely to impose extra costs on nursing home operators (pa tients with psychiatric problems, special dietary needs, etc.).
Differences between Medicare and M edicaid skilled coverage also result from differences in the program s' procedures for determining coverage. Medicare coverage is determined retroactively (although some intermediaries give informal indications o f coverage in advance). Medicaid coverage is guaranteed prospectively by program officials. N ursing homes have little or no responsibility for patient classification. Furthermore, M edicaid coverage is approved for relatively long pe riods-30, 60, or 90 days-in cases for which Medicare coverage would depend on changes in a patient's condition. Medicare makes its decisions on the basis o f actual experience, denying coverage to patients whose conditions stabilize or who prove lacking in restoration potential. These procedural differences make coverage for general nurs ing " observation" and for therapy services both more likely and more extensive under Medicaid than under Medicare.
Determinants of Access to Medicare Benefits
Medicare access problems stem in some areas from the sim ple absence o f skilled nursing facilities. Basically, Medicare-covered care is too limited to sustain reasonable-sized nursing homes. W ith use at average 1977 levels o f 395 days per 1,000 elderly, only a community o f 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 people could fully utilize a 60-bed facility. As a result, the presence o f skilled facilities in an area depends on whether there are sufficient M edicaid or private patients to support them. Where skilledlevel facilities exist, service to Medicare patients will depend on nurs ing homes' willingness to participate in Medicare and on the will ingness o f participating nursing homes to provide Medicare-covered care.
E xisten ce o f S k ille d F a c ilitie s
Medicaid demand for skilled care is probably more important than demand from private patients in determining the existence o f skilled nursing facility (SN F) beds. Generally, few skilled-level beds exist in states where M edicaid supports only a small number o f skilled days.
Virtually half o f the nonmetropolitan counties and 17 percent of the m etropolitan counties lack any certified skilled facilities. Those counties contain one-third o f the elderly residing in nonmetropolitan areas and about 5 percent o f the elderly from metropolitan areas. Overall, 13 percent o f the elderly reside in counties without skilled facilities (Feder and Scanlon, 1981) .
These statistics overstate the problem. Health facilities often are designed to serve the populations o f adjacent counties. Facilities in neighboring counties may be as close or as accessible to noncounty residents as they are to county residents.
Nevertheless, the absence o f skilled facilities in some states is quite severe. Over h alf the elderly population in 5 states (Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, N ew Mexico, and Oklahoma) Varying participation combined with the absence o f any skilled facilities in some areas produces great differences in the number of Medicare-certified beds per elderly person, as seen in 
A d v a n ta g e s o f M e d ica re P a r tic ip a tio n
Attraction o f Private Patients. N ursing homes' interest in Medicare participation depends on the advantages or disadvantages o f serving Medicare patients relative to the homes' primary market-Medicaid and private pay. N ursing homes oriented toward the private market have substantially larger proportions o f Medicare patients than other homes. In nursing homes that participate in Medicare but not Med icaid, 13 percent o f patient days are covered by Medicare, as compared with 7 percent in homes participating in Medicare and Medicaid (National Center for Health Statistics, 1977) . N ursing homes report that a primary advantage to (and reason for) Medicare participation is its value in attracting private-pay patients. This attraction works in two ways. First, patients who obtain Medicare coverage on ad mission may remain in nursing homes as private-pay patients after Medicare coverage ends. N o data are available to measure the frequency o f this occurrence, but the fact that patients receiving some Medicare benefits stayed an average o f 58 days in 1977-twice the average number o f Medicare-covered days per stay-suggests that such shifts are common (National Center for Health Statistics, 1977) . In inter views conducted for this study, nursing homes indicated that as many as half their Medicare patients may shift to private-pay status.
Medicare participation may also attract private patients by providing nursing homes with a " seal o f approval." Although many homes interviewed found any such " seal" unnecessary, given the demand for their services, other homes reported that they could not operate suc cessfully in their community without it.
H igher Reimbursements. Another reason that private-oriented homes tend to participate in Medicare has to do with their higher costs. To attract private-pay patients, nursing homes may maintain more staff than adequate patient care requires. If these homes cannot occupy all their beds with private patients and if the staff are not fully utilized, homes can serve patients with more extensive-care needs at little or no extra cost. In these circumstances, differences in Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement policies can make Medicare participation attractive.
M edicaid nursing home reimbursement systems have many provi sions that lim it what accounting costs are recognized for setting reimbursement rates. For example, they may include a percentile ceiling on individual cost centers or total operations, recognition of only actual construction or original purchase cost for capital instead o f book value, lim its on allowable interest rates, etc. Medicare only recently imposed ceilings on routine costs and these ceilings are likely to be less restrictive than most state Medicaid programs. The result is that homes whose costs significantly exceed the Medicaid ceiling in their state may receive considerably more from Medicare than M edicaid.
Medicare will also pay a proportionate share o f the costs o f main taining empty beds; many Medicaid programs will not. Hom es with low occupancy and/or high costs may find Medicare reimbursement attractive or may need the extra revenues Medicare provides to support their operations. N ot surprisingly then, facilities participating in Medicare have higher costs ($34.53 versus $22.21) per patient day and lower occupancy rates (87.3 percent versus 92.1 percent) than comparable facilities that do not participate (National Center for Health Statistics, 1977) .
D isa d v a n ta g e s o f M ed icare P a rtic ip a tio n
Medicare participation can impose costs as well as benefits, however. A Medicaid-oriented home that is experiencing neither low occupancy nor high costs may find that these costs outweigh Medicare's potential benefits. As described below, Medicare may require more rigorous health and safety standards and greater staffing than Medicaid and may impose different and burdensome accounting and reporting re quirements. Neither of these costs is likely to be fully reimbursed, as Medicare reimbursements are based on the averaging of costs for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients. Where Medicare and Med icaid practices are sim ilar, dual participation may be a matter of course. Where they are different, Medicaid-oriented homes may not participate in Medicare.
Certification Stan d ard s. Since the 1972 amendments to Medicare and M edicaid, federal law has required both programs to impose a single set o f health and safety standards on participating skilled nurs ing facilities. Surveys to assess compliance with these standards are, in fact, conducted by state employees. Certification o f compliance with the standards, however, proceeds through different channels depending on whether homes are participating in Medicaid only or in both Medicare and M edicaid. State Medicaid agencies have made the final determination o f compliance for Medicaid-only homes; and H CFA regional offices, for Medicare-Medicaid homes. In practice, regional offices have reportedly been more rigorous in enforcing stan dards than have some states. H C FA regional offices have pressed states to decertify some M edicaid nursing homes identified as out o f com pliance with certification requirements.
Com m ents from H C FA regional officials and nursing homes suggest that discrepancies in enforcement arise both with respect to overall health and safety standards and to the specific issue o f nursing staff.
State M edicaid programs pay for the bulk o f publicly supported nurs ing home care. Aggressive enforcement o f health and safety standards may put pressure on states to raise M edicaid reimbursement rates. Furthermore, where beds are in short supply, states report reluctance to terminate agreements with homes serving large numbers o f Med icaid patients. Closing these homes would leave patients with no place to go. Pressures o f this sort have reportedly led M edicaid agencies to certify homes, despite surveyors' negative findings and a negative decision on Medicare certification by the regional office.
U ntil recently, the federal government's ability to assure states' enforcement o f standards has been lim ited. Although some regional offices effectively pressed states in some cases, in others the authority was challenged. The Om nibus Reconciliation Act o f 1980 (P.L. 96-499) attem pted to alter this situation by clearly establishing the federal government as the final authority in determining compliance.
Where its authority has been clear (i.e ., for Medicare-Medicaid homes), the federal government's quality enforcement has not been influenced by cost or access concerns. Medicare has not experienced these pressures to the extent that Medicaid programs have. Given the small number o f Medicare patients, the program pays only a small share o f the additional costs that rigorous quality enforcement may impose. Furthermore, Medicare offers nursing home coverage as a short-term substitute for hospital care, not the long-term residence that M edicaid provides. Because the Medicare benefit is not as critical to individuals, the Medicare program has paid less attention to access than has the M edicaid program.
The federal government-at least in some regional offices-appears to be particularly rigorous (relative to the states) in interpreting and enforcing nurse staffing requirements. The Medicare and Medicaid conditions for participation require skilled nursing homes to have 24-hour nursing service " sufficient to meet nursing needs." N ursing homes and regional office personnel indicate that, in interpreting these provisions, states may make allowances for lim ited availability of nurses in local areas. Hence the formal listing o f a nurse on staff may be considered adequate, regardless o f absenteeism, illness, or other conditions that may, in practice, reduce staffing below the 24 hours required. Furthermore, states may not require that staffing reflect a home's particular mix o f patients, as long as minim al staffing needs are met. Regional offices, on the other hand, reportedly pay greater attention to homes' actual staffing and require that nursing staff equal what surveyors believe necessary to serve a given set o f patients. The result is reportedly higher staffing requirements for Medicare-partic ipating homes. W hile Medicare requirements may improve patient care, higher standards and/or operating requirements may also impose higher costs for Medicare than for M edicaid participation. Where these costs are incurred as a natural part o f doing business, i.e ., in homes staffing heavily to attract private patients, they represent no deterrent to Medicare participation. Conversely, where homes can earn acceptable profits (or net revenues) from M edicaid with minim al staff, they may be uninterested in participating in the Medicare program.
Reimbursement Practices. Even if a nursing home is adequately staffed to serve Medicare patients, Medicare's reimbursement practices may deter its participation. Medicare bases reimbursement on reasonable costs incurred in delivering care to Medicare beneficiaries. Costs are determined retroactively, according to detailed program rules for "allowable" or " nonallowable" costs. For routine services (including all nursing and nursing aide services and routine supplies), Medicare pays the average cost per day times the number o f days attributed to Medicare beneficiaries. For ancillary services and special supplies that are directly attributable to specific patients, Medicare pays a share of the home's costs equal to the proportion of charges attributed to Medicare beneficiaries. N ursing homes report three major problems with this system: the detailed accounting it requires, its retroactive application, and the actual rates it produces.
To determine reimbursable costs, the Medicare system requires nursing homes, like hospitals, to keep track o f their expenses on a departmental or cost-center basis. Separate cost centers exist for various support functions (adm inistration, maintenance, laundry, dietary, housekeeping, etc.) routine inpatient services, ancillary service de partments, outpatient services, and miscellaneous reimbursable and nonreimbursable costs. T o calculate Medicare's share o f a home's cost, the costs o f each general-support costs center m ust be allocated among the revenue-generating cost centers. Allocation is based on different types o f statistics-square feet for maintenance, pounds o f laundry and hours o f service for housekeeping, staff time spent for medical records or social services, requisitions from central supply, patient volume for adm inistration, etc. N ursing homes that certify only some o f their beds for Medicare m ust also keep statistics to distinguish routine service and support costs for Medicare and non-Medicare beds.
Although nursing homes may keep track o f costs in this fashion for purposes o f efficient management, many homes reportedly do not. A concern for efficiency m ight lead homes to make occasional as sessments o f support costs associated with specific types of patients or particular cost centers. B u t efficiency would not demand the detailed and continuous record keeping Medicare requires. Similarly, many M edicaid programs do not require such detailed cost finding. When they do, they may require different types o f statistics and calculations than Medicare.
N ursing homes interviewed for this study were asked to estimate accounting costs associated with Medicare. Since these estimates reflect the homes' perceptions o f Medicare-specific costs, rather than direct measurement, they m ust be treated with caution. Estimates for pre paring M edicare's cost report ranged from a low o f $250 to as high as $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 . Several homes indicated the need to assign full-or parttime staff specifically to bookkeeping for Medicare purposes and the need to rely on certified public accountants, preferably with Medicare experience, to complete the cost report. The variation clearly reflected differences in the accounting system employed by the home for its own purposes. But it also appeared to reflect differences in investment to maximize Medicare reimbursement. A nursing home operator who spent $ 5 ,0 0 0 on his cost report said that without that investment in expertise he would have lost $1 0 ,0 0 0 . Homes with low Medicare volume or less aggressive collection practices may not incur these expenses.
The nursing homes' interest in protective or creative accounting raises another aspect o f Medicare payment that causes them concern. In determining what it will pay, Medicare distinguishes between costs that are and are not allowable, and assesses these costs, on audit, after costs are actually incurred. N ursing homes object strenuously to Medicare's retroactive disallowances. Medicaid programs in most states do not pose this problem because the systems determine payment in advance, rather than retrospectively. Although some so-called "pro spective" systems may include retrospective audits, these systems tend to be sim pler than Medicare's, involving less detailed accounting and, therefore, a less intensive audit.
Predictable Medicare disallowances, based on readily understandable regulations, are not the homes' primary concern. The major issue is disallowances that result from retroactive interpretation of imprecise rules-in other words, intermediary judgm ents that reduce nursing home reimbursements below expected levels. Such disallowances may result from interpretation of specific costs as allowable or not allowable (e .g ., determ ining whether advertising expenses went to maintain ''a good public im age"-allowable-or to " increase patient utiliza tion"-not allowable; deciding whether employee profit-related bo nuses are fringe benefits-allowable-or profits-not fully allowable) or from decisions on how to allocate certain costs to Medicare patients (assessing the adequacy o f homes' statistical support for its nursing allocation; allowing adjustm ents when statistics are lacking). Homes report not only uncertainty as to how intermediaries will handle certain items but also inconsistent decisions on the same items from year to year. As one nursing home administrator put it: " Dealing with M edi care is like dealing with a cloud ." The problems created by unpredictable disallowances obviously depend on the amounts disallowed. Settlements can occur two to three years after costs have been incurred. At a m inim um , the prospect of disallowances impedes homes' investment or distribution of revenues during that period. A t a m axim um , actual disallowances mean that homes are paid less than the costs they incurred in treating Medicare beneficiaries. Both of these burdens, however, may be m itigated by Medicare's reported willingness to negotiate settlements allowing nurs ing homes to keep a portion o f the disallowed costs.
W hether the revenues Medicare provides are equal to or greater than the costs associated with service to Medicare patients is probably the most im portant issue raised regarding Medicare reimbursement methods. As noted earlier, for most services (including administra tion), Medicare pays a daily rate calculated as the nursing home's average cost per day for all its patients. Medicare patients would cost more than the average to the extent that Medicare service is more intensive than average, that extra staff time is required for docu mentation o f covered care, or that special bookkeeping and accounting are necessary to maintain Medicare records and complete cost reports. If any or all o f these costs are considerable, a home would lose money treating Medicare patients. The degree to which these costs are likely to be sm all or large will depend upon the similarity between Medicare requirements and a home's practices for its non-Medicare patients (private-pay and Medicaid).
Some nursing homes can m itigate losses (or reap benefits) even where Medicare requires some departure from their predominant mode o f operation. This can occur if a home identifies a " distinct part" o f its facility to serve Medicare patients. Where a home designates only some o f its beds as Medicare beds, Medicare will pay the nursing, housekeeping, and other costs that are directly attributable to those beds-i .e ., not average across the entire facility. Thus, if patients in the distinct part require more nursing than the rest o f the home's patients, more staff can be legitimately assigned to that unit and Medicare will pay a larger share o f staff costs.
U se o f the distinct part allows homes to obtain Medicare reim bursement commensurate with the nursing care Medicare patients require. In practice, staff allocation to the distinct part may exceed Medicare patients' needs. Medicare then supports staff that are not fully utilized. Creative management and accounting will also allow nursing homes to allocate a larger proportion o f other costs-overhead and capital-to the distinct part, essentially shifting some o f these costs to the Medicare program, increasing profits from private or Medicaid patients.
To use the distinct part in this way, however, requires a degree o f accounting sophistication not present in many homes. Allocation o f staff and other costs to the Medicare distinct part is audited carefully by intermediaries and must be supported with detailed records of actual staff time spent in the distinct part.
Even for homes unable to use a distinct part, Medicare's average cost reimbursement may provide a home adequate revenue if not all of its Medicare patients require intensive care. Homes report that Medicare patients who require rehabilitation rather than skilled nurs ing services require relatively little staff time and incur less than average costs. Gains on these patients can offset losses on other pa tients, if the home has a mix. Overall, most o f the participating homes contacted for this study indicated that they " break even" on Medicare reimbursement, despite their complaints about the program. Homes that do not expect such a sanguine result are apparently unlikely to participate in the first place.
D istrust o f the Medicare Program. Although economic issues are clearly critical to nursing homes' participation decisions, other aspects o f Medicare policy appear to influence borderline homes. N ursing home administrators in some states appear reluctant to deal with Medicare, due to their own or their associates' experience with the program in its early years. In response to dramatic and unanticipated expenditure increases, the Medicare program began imposing rigorous claims reviews in 1969. The result was a 60 percent drop in Medicarecovered days between 1969 Medicarecovered days between and 1972 Medicarecovered days between (H elbing, 1980 . Much o f the drop reflected retroactive denial of claims after care had been delivered.
Medicare's restriction o f coverage in 1969 has apparently left a lasting impression that the program can easily change rules that are critical to participating homes. W ithout a strong financial incentive, some nursing homes are unwilling to " risk" participation.
P a r tic ip a tin g S N F s ' A d m issio n P ractices
Medicare beneficiaries may encounter access problems even when an ample number o f homes participate. Participating facilities may be unable or unw illing to serve more or particular Medicare patients. Evidence o f this phenomenon is the weak relationship between nursing home use and nursing home participation. A simple regression showed that an increase o f 10 percent in Medicare-certified beds per elderly person is accompanied by less than a 5 percent increase in covered days per elderly person, on average. Experience differs considerably among states. As seen in Figure 1 , utilization rates vary substantially for states with sim ilar certified bed supplies.
A portion o f this phenomenon stems from the very tight supply of nursing home beds. There is such great demand that occupancy rates are uniformly very high. They averaged 89 percent in 1977 for skilled facilities. A t that tim e, 81 percent of those facilities reported they had a w aiting list. The mean number o f patients on those lists was 2 5 .3 . Given the discharge rates in skilled facilities, a patient on the bottom could expect to wait approximately 75 days for a bed in a particular home (N ational Center for Health Statistics, 1977) . Pa tients probably wait much less time as they may seek admission to several homes, and some patients (especially private-pay patients) probably move up the list faster than others.
Even though the waiting time may be considerably less than 75 days, a wait o f even 2 to 3 weeks can seriously affect Medicare use. W ith the emphasis on intensive short-term care, many persons may recover sufficiently while remaining in the hospital to become inel igible for Medicare coverage. A lso, by law, even patients who do not COVERED DAYS 1979 (per 1000 elderly) recover may lose access to Medicare benefits if they are not admitted to a nursing home within 30 days of their hospital discharge. The tight supply also gives homes the ability to select patients on other than a first-come, first-served basis. Homes may not have suf ficient staff to care adequately for patients requiring extensive or complex care. Hom es can choose to have smaller staffs, knowing that market conditions guarantee they can fill their beds with patients needing less care.
Ethical concerns may lead homes to refuse patients requiring more than existing staff. N ursing homes themselves may feel that they are not equipped to handle difficult cases properly. Medicare's certification enforcement also discourages admission of difficult cases, by requiring more staff for a more complicated case mix.
Medicare patients' short stay relative to Medicaid patients also cre ates demands on staff time that may make patients unattractive. Eighty-six percent o f Medicare patients stayed in nursing homes for fewer than 60 days (including noncovered as well as covered time), while more than half the Medicaid skilled patients in skilled facilities stayed longer than 180 days. New admissions require patient assess ments and development o f treatment plans; discharges also require planning and training. Rather than invest this time in short-stay patient after short-stay patient, nursing homes may prefer to accept patients who will stay in the home for some time.
Interviews with hospital discharge personnel indicate the extent to which nursing homes carefully distinguish among potential patients. When informed that a patient needs a bed, nursing homes reportedly obtain detailed information on the patient's source of payment (private resources, Medicare, or Medicaid) and on the patient's overall con dition. Hom es question not only the amount o f skilled and personal care a patient requires, but also request information on specific man agement problem s a patient may pose (psychological problems, ex cessive w eight, loudness, belligerence, special dietary needs, etc.).
Most hospital discharge personnel reported that payment source makes an important difference in the placement process. Private pa tients are typically adm itted to nursing homes without difficulty, regardless o f their care needs. To protect their revenues, homes some times require patients adm itted as private-pay to sign a contract to remain private-pay for a specified period o f time. Periods o f 6 months to 2 years have been reported. N ursing homes' preferences for Medicare over M edicaid patients (or vice versa) vary considerably from place to place. In some cases, discharge personnel said that homes openly discuss their preferences and maintain separate waiting lists for different types o f patients. In other cases homes reportedly keep their preferences to themselves.
For Medicare and M edicaid patients, unlike private patients, specific patient characteristics or care needs appear to affect access to beds. Preferences for different types o f Medicare patients differed across areas. Some hospitals indicated that nursing homes willing to take Medicare patients preferred patients who needed clearly identifiable skilled procedures. More commonly, homes favored patients with recognizable " restoration potential" and need for therapies (e .g ., pa tients recovering from strokes or fractured hips). N ursing homes ap peared particularly reluctant to accept Medicare patients who needed oxygen, care for extensive decubitus ulcers, or tube feedings.
N ursing homes' preferences can be interpreted as responses to the incentives associated with the Medicare payment systems. Patients receiving skilled procedures are clearly covered. Patients needing ther apy may cost less to care for and patients needing oxygen, skin care, or tube feedings are costly to care for. Homes clearly stand to gain or lose from particular types o f patients, depending on care needs relative to payment rates. T o paraphrase one home's explanation: "We don't discriminate by source o f payment, we discriminate by amount o f paym ent." In some cases this leads to outright rejection o f Medicare patients; in others, to careful patient selection.
Even if nursing homes are willing to provide Medicare-covered care, they may be unwilling to bill Medicare for their services, billing patients directly or billing Medicaid instead. N ursing homes and intermediaries agree that obtaining Medicare coverage is an art and is heavily dependent on detailed knowledge o f coverage requirements and documentation o f patients' conditions, plans o f care, and services provided. Homes with frequent turnover in personnel or with very few Medicare patients may be unwilling to invest in the effort coverage requires.
The burdens and uncertainties o f Medicare payment may lead homes to avoid taking patients for whom coverage is questionable or to admit these patients as private or Medicaid-not Medicare-patients. Since private charges are higher than Medicare payments, homes always have an incentive to treat patients on a private-pay basis. Where the probability o f Medicare coverage is questionable or the need for such coverage is particularly difficult to document (e .g ., for observation or supervision), homes may identify care as " noncovered" by Medicare, both to avoid an error for which they could be liable and to gain private rates. Unless beneficiaries appeal the homes' judgm ents, they lose Medicare benefits to which they are entitled.
Homes m ight also prefer billing Medicaid rather than Medicare in some cases, even though M edicaid rates are rarely higher than M edi care's. As described at the outset, M edicaid programs make coverage decisions in advance o f treatment, award longer periods o f coverage than Medicare for sim ilar cases, do not make coverage for observation or supervision contingent upon changes in patients' conditions, and do not require detailed documentation o f patients' conditions or service delivery. Given the greater probability o f coverage for longer periods under M edicaid than under Medicare, homes may find it simpler and less costly to bill M edicaid rather than Medicare for some patients.
Consequences o f Limited Medicare Service
To summarize, the availability o f Medicare nursing home benefits depends on: 1) the existence o f skilled-level facilities-a function of Medicaid coverage and payment policies; 2) the willingness o f nursing homes participating in Medicaid to participate in Medicare-a function of the sim ilarity between Medicare and Medicaid patients, certification rules, and reimbursement policies; and 3) participating nursing homes' interest in providing Medicare-covered service-a function o f Medicare patients' attractiveness relative to alternative patients. These conditions vary from place to place. In some areas, Medicare beneficiaries have no access to covered care; in others, access is lim ited; and in som e, access is not a problem. Limited access has consequences for beneficiaries, states, and the federal government.
E f f e c t s on M e d ic a re B en eficiaries
Lim ited nursing home benefits do more to affect Medicare beneficiaries' financial liabilities than their access to needed care. The occurrence o f hospital back-ups means that hospitals do serve Medicare benefi ciaries who cannot find nursing home beds.
H ospitals compensate both for the absence o f skilled facilities and for lim ited access to existing facilities. There are few areas which do not have either hospitals or skilled facilities. Furthermore, many hos pitals presently have excess capacity. Counting only hospitals that had less than 90 percent occupancy in 1979, only 6 percent o f the elderly live in a county without available hospital beds (Feder and Scanlon, 1981) . This represents less than one-half the number that reside in counties without skilled facilities.
The use o f hospitals as substitutes for skilled facilities under Medi care should not strain hospital capacity in most areas. I f all Medicarecovered SN F days in 1979 had been supplied by hospitals, they would amount to one-sixth o f the excess capacity in hospitals. Furthermore, serving patients who could not gain admission to a skilled facility would probably use little of the hospitals' excess capacity. Most of these patients remain hospitalized rather than being discharged anyway and, therefore, are already counted in current hospital utilization.
As long as beneficiaries remain in hospitals, they are likely to receive the skilled care they require. Medicare will pay in full for that care, for all but the tiny proportion o f Medicare beneficiaries who exhaust their covered hospital days. In contrast, patients who enter nursing homes (perhaps under pressure from a fully occupied hospital) may be denied the Medicare benefits to which they are legally entitled. Obviously no benefits will be available in homes that do not participate in Medicare-a fact that a beneficiary can readily comprehend. But beneficiaries are less likely to perceive the denial o f benefits that results from participating homes' reluctance to subm it claims for which Medicare coverage is uncertain or hard to obtain. N ursing homes' judgm ents on coverage tend to be conservative, since nursing homes gain more from private than from public payment and since homes bear a financial risk for subm itting inappropriate Medicare claims. H om es' reluctance to subm it claims would un doubtedly increase if Congress enacted the administration's proposal to make nursing homes liable for all erroneous claims, not just the excess over 5 percent.
Beneficiaries can appeal a nursing home's judgm ent that Medicare coverage is inappropriate, requesting that the claim be submitted anyway. But most beneficiaries are likely to accept the home's judg ment, unaware o f the benefits they forgo. In these circumstances, beneficiaries will pay the full cost o f their nursing home stay.
E f f e c t on S ta t e M e d ic a id P ro g ram s
States are similarly likely to bear the costs of lim ited nursing home participation and reluctance to bill Medicare. Some homes value the certainty and sim plicity of M edicaid payment, even if rates are lower than M edicare's. To the extent that homes prefer to bill M edicaid, states finance what should be a fully federal expense.
Some states have tried to minimize this occurrence by pressing homes to collect from Medicare first. A 1981 survey by the George W ashington University Intergovernmental Health Policy Project iden tified 15 states requiring nursing homes that participate in Medicaid to participate in Medicare. As described above, participation by itself may not affect adm ission or billing practices. Recognizing this fact, some states require nursing homes to bill Medicare for all potentially covered patients before billing M edicaid. " Medicare-maximization" policies, which require nursing homes to present Medicare denials when subm itting M edicaid claims for skilled care, have been used in California (in lieu o f mandatory participation); in states that also mandate participation (e .g ., New York and Michigan); and in other states for homes that voluntarily participate in both programs (e .g ., Connecticut and New Jersey). New York has been particularly ag gressive in pursuing this policy, requiring homes not only to submit all potential M edicaid-skilled claims to Medicare but also to resubmit for reconsideration any claims that Medicare denies. Michigan has taken a sim ilar approach but has required fewer reconsiderations. In the summer o f 1981, however, M ichigan was considering requiring not only reconsiderations by intermediaries but administrative appeals.
The success o f a state's Medicare maximization policy in increasing billings to Medicare appears to depend heavily on certain features of mandatory participation and Medicare administration. M ichigan al lows homes to certify only some o f their Medicaid-certified beds for Medicare, perm itting homes to adm it patients whose Medicare cov erage is questionable to noncertified beds. This may help to explain why M ichigan experienced no increase in Medicare use as a result o f its policies. N ew York, which does not allow homes this approach, The short duration o f New Y ork's Medicare boom appears to reflect intermediaries' initial inability to handle the enormous increase in claim s. Before the state required billings to Medicare, Medicare in termediaries in New York performed medical review on only a sample o f claims. In response to New Y ork's initiative, the regional office required intermediaries to review 100 percent of claims and to de termine coverage prospectively. W ith new procedures and an expanded staff, Medicare reduced its coverage below the levels that prevailed before Medicare-maximization began.
This experience suggests that Medicaid financial liabilities depend heavily on Medicare claims review procedures. The administration has constrained intermediaries' budgets, raising the probability that in termediaries would have difficulty coping with the onslaught o f claims a Medicare-maximation policy could induce. If so, states would gain heavily from pursuing such a policy.
E f f e c t s on the F e d e r a l G overnm ent
Medicare finances only a narrowly defined portion o f nursing home care. Its beneficiaries are therefore dependent for access on an industry oriented toward other patients. Current federal policies fail to make m aximum use o f the Medicaid-oriented industry and cost the gov ernment money.
H ospitals' retention o f patients who could be placed in nursing homes means that Medicare pays about four times as much as necessary for patient care. Estimates of back-up days ranging from 1 million to 9 .2 million imply an annual cost to the federal government of $100 million to $900 million.
Policy Options
Because Medicare is a federal program, solutions to availability prob lems require changes in federal policy. These policy changes need not sacrifice Medicare's current limitation to short-term, post-acute nurs ing home care. Given its current benefit structure, the program has two options: 1) the program could address only the federal cost prob lem, accepting lim ited access but reducing the price it pays for patients backed up in hospitals, or 2) the program could address all parties' problems, im proving access for Medicare beneficiaries by adapting many o f its policies to general practice in the nursing home market.
Congress supported the first option with 1980 legislation that au thorized payment for back-up days at average M edicaid-skilled nursing home rates. Lower rates would apply only to hospitals with occupancy rates below 80 percent. Before this provision was implemented, Con gress amended it to eliminate the 80 percent occupancy condition, requiring payment at the lower rate to all hospitals and areas with "excess b ed s."
The D epartm ent o f Health and Hum an Services has been slow to implement this provision, apparently for two reasons. First, identi fication o f excess beds involves values, not science, and is fraught with political difficulties. Second, and perhaps more importantly, restricting payment for some hospital days does not eliminate the fixed costs associated with those days. Someone has to bear those costs, and their allocation among hospital payers is highly controversial.
Medicare could reduce the cost it bears for lim ited access by paying the nursing home rate in as many places as possible and by adjusting its rules to elim inate or minimize its share o f fixed costs above the rate. Because lower rates would reduce the likelihood that hospitals would identify patients awaiting placement, Medicare would have to accompany this policy with a rigorous claims review.
This strategy would solve the federal government's financial prob lems, but without a commensurate reduction in social costs. Lower rates for back-up days would eliminate any incentive hospitals have to retain patients inappropriately. But lower rates will do nothing to eliminate back-ups that reflect placement problems and not hos pitals' incentives. To the extent hospitals cannot or do not reduce the costs o f these days, hospital payers other than Medicare will bear costs that Medicare will not pay.
An alternative strategy would have Medicare reduce costs by re ducing barriers to access for Medicare patients. As a small purchaser in a large m arket, Medicare cannot change the nursing home industry. But the program could get more service from that industry by acting as a sm all buyer, accom modating its policies to industry practice.
More homes would probably participate in Medicare if the program allowed homes to accept payment at Medicaid rates or developed its own prospective payment system. These homes and homes already participating in Medicare would probably serve more Medicare patients if Medicare payment recognized the above-average costs o f more in tensive service or shorter-than-average stays for some o f its patients. These reforms would probably do far more to eliminate back-up days than reducing hospital payment.
The federal government's concern with Medicare administration should go beyond fiscal issues to assurance that beneficiaries receive the benefits to which they are entitled. Policies that put nursing homes at risk for all incorrect claims submissions run counter to this objective. Far more appropriate would be prospective review o f claims that informs both homes and beneficiaries o f the payments they can expect. Prospective review would make formal and uniform the in formal review on admission now used by several intermediaries and would be equivalent to the approach taken by state Medicaid pro gram s. Authorized periods o f coverage need not be long; they could vary with diagnosis and a patient's condition on admission. The purpose o f the new approach would be to make coverage predictable, not to extend covered stays. 
